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Abstract 
Uncertainties related with underground CO 2 storage play a vital role in risk assessment with respect to Carbon storage and 
capture projects (CCS). The main purpose of risk assessment is to determine a qualitative and quantitative picture of hazardous 
processes or events. One makes  a comprehensive inventory of risk factors, and stores the results  in a FEP (Features, Events and 
Process) database. The properties of the geological system itself and  natural or human -induced processes determine the future 
system p roperties.  
 
The FEP’s may interact. In this paper we propose to describe  this  interaction of FEPs within the framework of (discrete time)  
Markov Chains. In such an approach various states are defined . The system can “jump”  from one state to another. The 
probabilistic evolution of the system can be followed, and conclusions can be drawn as to visit  times of the various states. Also, 
the most likely ultimate fate of a system in dependence of initial  state can be determined . This approach offers a complementary 
supporting tool  for scenario-thinking, as it takes into account the evolution of all  possible follow-ups of relevant physical 
processes and events quantitatively . It is not about just following a few scenario’s. Without the machinery of Markov Chains  this 
can hardly be done in full . An added bonus of this approach  is that questions of policy makers, and of licensi ng authorities can be 
answered  in a numerical way . 
 
© 2008 Elsevier Ltd . All rights reserved  
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1. Introduction 
Assessing the feasibility of CO 2 storage systems entails safety and environmental issues. Their study relies on a 
methodological approach which encompass consequence analysis of (unwanted) CO2 migration via faults, wells 
etc… towards the subsurface at a pre -determined site. Generally, such a n approach starts with the hazard assessment 
focusing on establishing  a comprehensive inventory of risk factors (Features, Events and Processes or FEPs)  at  the 
site at hand. S ubsequent ly a  selection of the most critical factors must be done, and they will lead to  CO2 leakage 
scenarios [1] . One then studies the scenario’s in any concrete situation, i.e. for each proposed storage site.  In this 
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paper we will propose  a way of “ generalizing ” scenario -thinking. We expect that with its help, it will become a little 
easier to answer (some of) the questions of policy makers,  permit issuing authorities, and the general public .  
 
2. Problem Definition  
When TNO’s FEP database was first established  in work by Wildenborg et al [1], it was intended to start  
establishing and evaluating the  scenarios that might lead to hazardous situ ations. It contains static data but also  
addresses the  linkage b etween the individual FEP's and site -specific parameters. The database therefore is not only a 
suitable FEP selection tool, but also aims at assisting with  scenario analysis. The work -flow incorporates the 
possibility of entering site specific data and FEP links. This should lead to a visual overview of FEP groups  that 
might be important at any specific site,  and ready to be used in a scenario analysis.  
 
In practice, however, scenario’s seemed to be proposed by common sense, and the FEP database was typically used 
only as a kind of en cyclopedia “in the background”. All kinds of visual aids to combine the information in the 
database linking the FEPS, turned out to be of little help. W orking with the database as an assistant in scenario 
analysis in this way was somewhat uncomfortable. At the same time, it was felt th at one should do more than use the 
database as a mere encyclopedia , or “shopping list” for crossing off items.  
 
With this in mind , we propose a different outlook  in which not scenario’s are the main players, but states of the 
system. The FEP database may be truly helpful in defining them. We will describe this outlook in the next chapter in 
broad outline.  
 
3. Methodology 
In our  approach, we do not think in terms of scenario’s, but rather in terms of “ states” of the subsurface.  
Any possible combination of Events and Processes  (EP’s) is a possible state. The initial, hopefully quiet, situation 
in the subsurface is also an event for our purposes. The “Features” -part from the FEP’s are properties of events and 
processes, and when they change that  may well be an event  in itself. In this sense they do play a role.   
 
If we have N number of events and processes we have ( 2N – 1) possible subsets, i.e. states. For N =  10 that amounts 
to more than thousand states  alre ady. Considering  the total number of events and processes in the database we 
would have an “unworkable” number of states.  Therefore, from previous hazard risk assessment studies, we have 
chosen a limited number of states. How did we select them?  
 
Below we present an example for  explanatory purposes. It is a very simple example , that can be enlarged, and 
adapted for different situations . The future evolution of the geological storage system is going to be altered by 
events and processes. These alterations may take place in the CO 2 migration pathways (wells, seals, faults). Five  
general categories have been scrutinized. 
 
1. Natural Changes in the subsurface  (Seismicity )       
2. Human activities in the subsurface  (Drilling, Injection , Monitoring )  
3. Unexpected Issues (Overpressure) 
4. Geo -Ch emical Phenomena (Dissolution, Chemical Weathering)      
5. Geo -Mechanical Phenomena (Compaction, Uplift)   
             
With help of the above scheme, we now define 10 states for a simplified description of the subsurface system . 
 
State 1: Drilling phase 
State 2: Injection phase 
State 3: Monitoring in a “quiet” situation  
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State 4: Monitoring : seal problem  exists 
State 5: Monitoring : well problem exists 
State 6: Monitoring : seal & well problems exist  
State 7: Monitoring : seismic activity exists 
State 8: Monit oring : reservoir overpressure exists  
State 9: Upward flow through seal = first absorbing state (see below) 
State 10: Upward flow through well = second absorbing state  
 
This set -up is very flexible. It can be made to include  different subsurface characteristics and perceived hazardous 
situations. The site-specific FEP analysis by a team of specialists in any given situation will define the ultimate set 
of states.  
 
For example , “ seismic activity” may be defined by this team to possess a site -specific quanti tative threshold. Or, the 
team wants to include an eleventh state: upward flow through seal and well simultaneously. Moreover, some states 
will not be  included when assessed “a priori” as too improbable to merit such an inclusion.  
 
Having defined the poss ible st ates o f the system, we then will use the theory of Markov Chains to see what the 
likely evolution of such a system will be. Recall that i n a Markov Chain we have a set of states {s 1,s2,s3,s4…..sn} 
with the property that  the transition probability from one state to another does not depend on the history, but only on 
the present state of the system . In other words, the set of states are connected in the sense that a transition “i → j ” is 
possible with a so-called transition probability denoted by p (i, j), see [2].  The inclination for change is described 
with this transit ion probability, it is a probability per unit  time that a jump from one specified state to another  will 
occur.  
 
It is up to the experts to  produce viable transition probabilities in any site specific situation. We will not address here 
how that should be done. It  is, nevertheless , a question of considerable  practical importance, and  there is a rich 
literature on the subject, tackling the psychology of elicitation as well as more formal i ssues [see for instance 3,4].  
By establishing these numbers, we end up with the mat rix of transition probabilities. We emphasize, again, that 
Markov theory pre -supposes that previous state -history must be deemed irrelevant.  
 
Before working out the exampl e we note the following. States 9 and 10 above  are so -called absorbing states. They 
can be reached from the non-absorbing (transient) states (directly or via other transient states), but once reached the 
system stays there. We need to use the theory of absorbing  Markov Chains for answering questions put forward 
below. The theory of these special chains is described in [2], whereas a general account of Markov Chains is in [5].  
 
4. Working out the  example  
4.1.  Questions to be asked 
Let us ask ourselves which question s somebody in charge of site selection, or issuing permits, would ask. From a 
long-term perspective, then,  the following questions are relevant.  
 
1) If the system is at state j, what is the probability it ends up in each of the absorbing states in the chain?  
2) If in state j, how much time will the system reside on average in any of the transient states before going into 
an absorbing state. And, consequently, how much time will elapse before absorption?  
 
The relevance of the first question is manifest if there are several absorbing s tates are feasible, but with different 
potential risks . In our example gas may diffuse out of a leaky reservoir in a final state, or force its way up through a 
leaky well. One possibility may be deemed more fearsome than the other. You, as a policy maker,  want to know 
what the odds are for the final situation.  
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It is important to note here that in an absorbing chain the system will eventually end up in one of the absorbing 
states. This is a mathematical fact. The real ly important question is what timescales are involved.  Why is that?  
During the evolution of the system it will visit several states, potentially, before being caught in an absorbing state.  
These visits may require financial efforts from humans in terms of mitigation activities, or they are just disliked by 
themselves. Policy makers will want to know how long the system is expected to reside in such “expensiv e” states.  
Questions like this are linked with public acceptance and political sensitiveness, &.  The relevant timescales are the 
ones answered in the second question  above . 
 
4.2.  The absorbing chain  
The following transition probabilities in the above example are set by the authors.  The non -zero transition 
probabilities are:  
 State 
1 
 State 
2 
State 3 State 4 State 5 State 6 State 7 State 8 State 9 State 10 
State 1 0.5 0.5         
State 2  0.99  8.0E -03      2.0E -03    
State 3   0.9939  1.0E -03  4.0E -03  1.0E -04  1.0E -03     
State 4    0.9097   8.0E -02  3.0E -04   1.0E -02   
State 5   0.4  0.595 1.0E -03  1.0E -03    3.0E -03  
State 6    0.4  0.586  1.0E -03   1.0E -02  3.0E -03  
State 7   0.947 1.0E -02  4.0E -02  3.0E -03      
State 8    1.0E -03     0.999   
State 9         1.0  
State 10          1.0 
 
Table 1: Matrix showing the probabilities for changing states .  
  
 State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4 State 5 State 6 State 7 State 8 
State 1 2.00 100.00 726.90 77.98 7.26 15.27 0.77 200.00 
State 2 0 100.00 726.90 77.98 7.26 15.27 0.77 200.00 
State 3 0 0 900.20 77.51 8.98 15.22 0.95 0 
State 4 0 0 33.70 79.83 0.34 15.44 0.07 0 
State 5 0 0 891.37 76.94 11.37 15.12 0.94 0 
State 6 0 0 34.71 77.32 0.35 17.37 0.08 0 
State 7 0 0 888.59 77.51 8.97 15.23 1.94 0 
State 8 0 0 33.70 79.83 0.34 15.44 0.07 1000.00 
 
 
Table 2: Fundamental Matrix  N. Matrix shows calculated time (in years) for changing states.  
 
The “ fundamental matrix” N(i,j) represents the expected residence time in transient state j when the system  started  
in transient state i. This matrix is 8x8 in our case, since we have 8 transient states. This fundamental matrix is basic 
for understanding the durations involved.  It converts the rather abstract transition probabilities into a more 
comfortable entity: the time you expect the system to spend in the various transient states before reaching one of the 
absorbing states.  Assuming the unit of transition probabilities is yr-1 , the computed durations in N are in years . 
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 State 9 State 10 
State 1 0.932 0.068 
State 2 0.932 0.068 
State 3 0.927 0.073 
State 4 0.953 0.047 
State 5 0.921 0.079 
State 6 0.947 0.053 
State 7 0.927 0.073 
State 8 0.953 0.047 
 
Table 3 : Absorption Matrix  B 
 
The “absorption -matrix” B(i,j) in table 3  represents the probability to end up in absorbing state j, once you started in 
transient state i. Thi s is a 8x2 matrix in our case, because of our 8 transient states and 2 absorbing stat es.   
The time to absorption  from each initial transient state is the expected time to absorption from each of these  
transient states. Its values  can be trivially derived from matrix  N by appropriate summation .  
 
When inspecting the results you will notice there is something  striking  with one of the states . In state 8 there are just 
two transitions: the transition to an absorbing state, and staying as is. One might envisage the possibility of 
mitigation actions, consequent upon discovering a problem. This, t hen, might lead to inclusion of a “mitigation” 
state. We will not pursue this matter in detail. In general,  “ experimenting” with systems like this will sharpen the 
insights as to  the necessary details for describing the evolution.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this pap er, we dealt with CO2
 storage systems. We advocate the usage of  “ states” in order to compute relevant  
evolutionary timescales in such a system . We thereby draw upon the theory of absorbing Markov Chains.  “ State-
thinking” enables the  generalization of “ scenario-thinking” as it takes care of all kinds of transitions, not only the 
major ones generally considered in a scenario. Furthermore, by numerically “experimenti ng” with state  dyn amics,  
one may acquire a more acute awareness for what information is cruci al in answering questions for policy makers.   
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